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CASE COMMENTS
is given to all factors.39 Under the previous test the Board considered
only those factors which favored severance. Now both the interests of
the employer and of the craft employees can be protected.
W. GILBERT FAULK, JR.
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND ORAL
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
A partly performed, oral employment contract for a term of years
is unenforceable because it is "within" the "one year clause" of the
statute of frauds.' Sometimes an employee, in reliance upon a pros-
pective employer's promise to reduce their contract to writing, will
accept the new job and perhaps substantially change his position, only
to be discharged before the contract period has expired. In a resultant
action on the contract, it is unsettled whether the employee's claim
for relief based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, or the em-
ployer's defense of the statute of frauds, will prevail.
In Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc.,2 Dr. Feldman,
authorized spokesman for the new Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital in
Miami, approached Dr. W. L. Tanenbaum in Allentown, Pennsyl-
vania, regarding a job in radiology. To qualify for the job, Dr. Tanen-
baum went to Florida and took state examinations in order to obtain
the necessary license. According to Dr. Tanenbaum, the hospital
offered employment for five years and promised to reduce the contract
to writing. Although no writing was made, Dr. Tanenbaum accepted
"'The federal courts will probably uphold the Mallinckrodt test. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the American Potash test and held that the
Board has a duty to consider all relevant factors. Royal McBee v. NLRB, 302 F.2d
33o (4 th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167 (4 th Cir. 1959).
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the Board may consider all
factors including the history of bargaining and integration of the production pro-
cess. NLRB v. Lord Baltimore Press, Inc., a LAB. REL. RaP. (64 L.R.R.M.) 2055 (8th
Cir. Dec. 28, 1966). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also held that a
Board's decision regarding an appropriate bargaining unit is final unless it appears
that the Board acted in a "capricious or arbitrary manner." NLRB v. Hurley Co.,
31o F.2d 158, 161 (8th Cir. 1962).
'The essence of the original Statute of Frauds, Stat., 1677, 29 Car. II, c. 3, is
statutory law in all of the states. The one year clause of the English act provided,
"[N]o action shall be brought ... upon any agreement that is not to be performed
within the space of one year from the making thereof; unless the agreement upon
which action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be
in writing...." ILLISrON, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CONTRACTs 373 (6th ed. 1954).
2,9o So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1966).
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the offer, resigned his position in Allentown, sold his house at a loss,
and in September ig6i, moved his family to Florida. He purchased
a home in Miami and immediately began practice for Biscayne Hos-
pital. In April 1962, he was notified, apparently without explanation,
that his services would no longer be needed. After his discharge, he
sold his Miami house at a loss and secured employment in Detroit,
but at a lower salary.
Dr. Tanenbaum instituted a suit based on promissory estoppel
against the Biscayne Hospital for damages for breach of the em-
ployment contract. Although the hospital relied on the statute of
frauds, the trial court allowed the case go to the jury, which returned
a $4o,ooo verdict for the doctor. However, upon motion, the court
entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. The
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, and the Florida
Supreme Court granted certiorari. In affirming, the Supreme Court, by
a 4-to-2 decision, refused to adopt the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
The majority noted that promissory estoppel never had been embraced
by any Florida case and stated that it is the legislative-not the judi-
cial- prerogative to adopt new provisions, especially ones which may
have the effect of nullifying the statute of frauds.
The dissent gave three reasons for disagreeing with the conclusion
of the majority. First, the majority failed to give sufficient weight to
the fact that the promise upon which the plaintiff relied was not
the promise to employ but a promise to execute and deliver the
written five-year contract. Second, Florida recognizes as an exception
to the statute of frauds the uncodified doctrine of part performance of
oral contracts for the sale of realty by a vendee in possession3 and
likewise should recognize the uncodified doctrine of promissory estop-
pel. And third, the adoption of any legal principle such as promissory
estoppel is more of a judicial prerogative than a legislative one.
The most widely accepted definition of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel is that set forth in section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise.4
3 Maloy v. Boyett, 53 Fla. 956, 43 So. 243 (1907).
4RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). However, in the American Law Insti-
tute's proprosed new Restatement the drafters have deleted the phrase, "of a
definite and substantial character," from the definition. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS
§ go (Tent. Draft No. 2 1965).
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This Restatement definition contains four elements essential to
establishing a claim based on promissory estoppel: (i) a gratuitous
promise; (2) reasonable expectancy by the promisor that his promise
would induce action or forbearance by the promisee; (3) definite
and substantial action or forbearance by the promisee in reliance
on the promise; and (4) resultant injustice if the promise is not en-
forced.
Courts have been inclined not to apply promissory estoppel in
the few cases which have involved a promise to reduce to writing
an oral employment contract. The employee has recovered in only
three5 of such cases, while relief has been denied in seven. 6
Apparently there is no disagreement as to what is a gratuitous
promise. It is gratuitous if no bargained-for consideration is exchanged
for it. A naked promise to reduce to writing a pre-existing, valid
contract is an example of this type of promise.
Likewise, the determination of what promises the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance by the promisee
has presented no particular difficulty.
Usually the courts consider the two elements of "action or for-
bearance of a definite and substantial character," such that "injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement" of the gratuitous promise to-
gether under some rubric devised by the particular court,7 such as
"unconscionable injury."s A wrongfully discharged employee must
always suffer some sort of monetary loss or great personal inconveni-
ence. 9
The two principal causes of monetary loss and personal inconveni-
ence are (i) change of residence and (2) change of job. When an
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (gth Cir. 1954); Seymour v.
Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 1o6 Pac. 88 (19o9); Harmon v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd.,
79 Nev. 4, 377 P.2d 622 (1963).
0Kahn v. Cecelia Co., 40 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Offeman v. Robertson-
Cole Studios, Inc., 8o Cal. App. 1, 251 Pac. 83o (1926); Standing v. Morosco, 43
Cal. App. 244, 184 Pac. 954 (1919); Allen v. Moyle, 84 Idaho 18, 367 P.2d 579 (1961);
Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 31 Ill. 2d 507, 202 N.E.2d 516 (1964); McCrillis
v. American Heel Co., 85 N.H. 165, 155 AtI. 410 (1931); Kooba v. Jacobitti, 59 N.J.
Super. 496, 158 A.2d 194 (App. Div. 196o).
7See, e.g., Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, io6 Pac. 88, 93-94 (1909) ("change
of position;" "great injury and loss"); Offeman v. Robertson-Cole Studios, Inc., 8o
Cal. App. 1, 251 Pac. 83o, 836 (1926) ("sustained a loss"); McCrillis v. American
Heel Co., 85 N.H. 165, 155 At. 410, 411-12 (1931) ("detriment to himself;" "hard-
ship"); Kooba v. Jacobitti, 59 N.J. Super. 496, 158 A.2d 194, 197 (App. Div. 196o)
("prejudicial reliance").
8E.g., Standing v. Morosco, 43 Cal. App. 244, 184 Pac. 954, 955 (1919).
9lbid.
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employee changes his residence, it must not be for the better.10 Thus, in
Standing v. Morosco," where the employee sold his home and furniture
in New York City and moved with his wife to Los Angeles, recovery was
denied because the employee's property in New York might have been
disposed of at a profit and the change of residence might have been
an agreeable one. When an employee gives up another job to work
for an employer, he must do more than allege that he "materially
changed his position to his detriment in reliance upon said [oral]
agreement."'12 He must have irrevocably lost his former job, as
happened in Seymour v. Oelrichs,'3 where plaintiff resigned as captain
of detectives in San Francisco and could not thereafter be restored to
that position.
When an employee changes his residence and resigns from a job
in reliance upon a prospective employer's promise to give him a
written contract, relinquishment of particular earned privileges at
his former job,14 such as rights to continuous employment 15 or to
long leaves of absence without prejudice to his tenure,16 and change
of residence from one state to another 17 may be sufficient to meet
squarely the test set forth in Restatement section go. However, recov-
ery was granted in Harmon v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd.8 despite
the fact that there was neither change of residence nor change of job.
Estoppel was invoked against the promisor after the employee-promisee
partly performed the contract, prepaid the contract price for his
franchise, and purchased two new airport limousines in reliance upon
the promise to reduce the contract to writing.
It is generally conceded that all jurisdictions which recognize
promissory estoppel require as operative facts at least the four elements
set out by Restatement section 90. However, some jurisdictions require
certain additional elements. Illinois requires that the promise to put
the oral contract in writing be made by the employer with fraudulent
intent.' 9 In this respect, the doctrine of promissory estoppel coincides
with the doctrine of estoppel in pais, commonly called equitable
"-See Standing v. Morosco, 43 Cal. App. 244, 184 Pac. 954 (1919); B.F.C. Morris
Co. v. Mason, 171 Okla. 589, 39 P.2d 1 (1934) (per curiam).
143 Cal. App. 244, 184 Pac. 954 (1919).
12Kahn v. Cecelia Co., 4o F. Supp. 878, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
1156 Cal. 782, io6 Pac. 88 (19o9).
"'Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954); see Seymour
v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, io6 Pac. 88 (igo9).
"5Ibid.
"Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954).
"-Ibid.
179 Nev. 4, 377 P.2d 622 (1963).
"See Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 31 Ill. 2d 507, 2o2 N.E.2d 516 (1964).
1967] CASE COMMENTS 351
estoppel, in which generally there must be a misrepresentation. 20
Thus, if the promise is made in good faith and then broken, no claim
based on promissory estoppel will lie regardless of the extent of
reliance by the promisee. On the other hand, New Hampshire not
only demands detrimental reliance by the employee but also resultant
undue benefit to the employer. 21
Despite the apparent conflict between the doctrine of promissory
estoppel and the statute of frauds, the Restatement of Contracts
applies the doctrine to cases involving statute of frauds problems. 22
One provision of the statute of frauds requires agreements not to be
performed within a year to be in writing. Tanenbaum involves an
oral employment agreement not to be performed within a year and
also an oral promise to reduce the agreement to writing.
There appears to have been no significant discussion concerning
the difference between invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel
where the employer has orally promised to reduce to writing an oral
agreement to employ, and where the employer simply has orally
promised to employ. The dissent in Tanenbaum notes the distinction
but does not discuss its significance.
Technically, it appears the doctrine is not applicable where an
employee relies on his employer's promise to employ him because
that promise is made in exchange for the promise to render services.
Perhaps the bases for the distinction between a claim based on the
promise to reduce to writing and a claim based on the promise to
employ is one of justifiable reliance. A promise to reduce to writing
is objective evidence of an attempt to comply with the statute of
frauds, consequently an employee is justified in relying thereon. But
-5 WILISrON, CONTRAMrS § 692 (3d ed. 1961).
IMcCrillis v. American Heel Co., 85 N.H. 165, 155 Ad. 410 (1931).
2RESTATEhiENT, CoNTRACrs § 178, comment f (1932) says:
Through there has been no satisfaction of the Statute, an estoppel may
preclude objection on that ground in the same way that objection to the
nonexistence of other facts essential for the establishment of a right or a de-
fence may be precluded .... [A] promise to make a memorandum, if...
relied on [by substantial action), may give rise to an effective promissory
estoppel if the Statute would otherwise operate to defraud.
Professor Williston, who as Reporter largely drafted the Restatement of Contracts,
clearly intended for promissory estoppel to apply to statute of frauds cases. See
generally 4 ALI PROCEEDINGS 85-114 (App. 1926).
[W]hen one considers the part Samuel Williston took in the formulation
of the Restatement of Contracts and then examines Section 178, Comment
f., one must conclude that there was an intention to carry promissory es-
toppel... into the statute of frauds if the additional factor of a promise to
reduce the contract to writing is present.
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295, 298 (9 th Cir. 1954).
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where there is no attempt to satisfy the requirements of the statute,
there is little justifiable reason for relying on the promise to employ,
it being a promise which forms an unenforceable contract. However,
even though there has been no promise to reduce to writing, an em-
ployee who has changed position significantly has been granted relief
frequently on grounds that it would be fraudulent or unconscionable
to permit assertion of the statute.23
The decisions have varied as to the reasons for accepting or declin-
ing the use of promissory estoppel. When a court grants relief on the
basis of the doctrine, its decision invariably reflects equitable con-
siderations. The employer will not be allowed to repudiate his
promise if such repudiation would result in working a manifest fraud
upon the employee. 24
The most frequent reason for denying the doctrine, aside from
a failure of the allegations to support the claim, 25 is that part per-
formance by the employee will not take the oral agreement out of
the statute of frauds.26 In these cases no significance is attributed to
the promise to reduce the contract to writing.
The injustice which often may result from rigid application of
the statute of frauds may be circumvented by holding an employer
to his promise through the use of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
When the equities in favor of the employee are particularly strong and
there is clear and convincing evidence that a contract actually was
made, the doctrine should be applied even at the expense of strict
adherence to the requirements of the statute of frauds. The Restate-
ment definition is broad and general enough so that the doctrine may
be used quite flexibly. Instead of refusing outright to adopt the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel, each jurisdiction should determine
whether the equities in each case are sufficiently strong to warrant its
application in counteraction to the statute of frauds.
GEORGE A. RAGLAND
aHunt Foods, Inc. v. Phillips, 248 F.2d 23 (9 th Cir. 1957); Montgomery v.
Moreland, 2o5 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1953); Fibreboard Prods. Inc. v. Townsend, 202
F.2d i8o (9th Cir. 1953); Marston v. Downing Co., 73 F.2d 94 (5 th Cir. 1934);
Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (195o); Sessions v. Southern Cal.
Edison Co., 47 Cal. App. 2d 611, 118 P.2d 935 (1941); Norman v. Nash, 102 Ga. App.
5o8, 116 S.E.2d 624 (196o); Alexander-Seewald Co. v. Marett, 53 Ga. App. 314, 185
S.E. 589 (1936).
"Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, io6 Pac. 88, 96 (19o9).
-,E.g., Standing v. Morosco, 43 Cal. App. 244, 184 Pac. 954 (1919); Sinclair v.
Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 31 Ill. 2d 507, 2o2 N.E.2d 516 (1964); McCrillis v. American
Heel Co., 85 N.H. 165, 155 At. 410 (1931).
" E.g., Allen v. Moyle, 84 Idaho 18, 367 P.2d 579 (961). See Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d
1053, 1083-95 (1949).
